UC-Davis’ Belcher Wins the First Annual Lamb Prize

David Belcher and his faculty sponsor Ethan Schiener of U.C. Davis

David Belcher and his faculty sponsor Ethan Schiener of U.C. Davis

Negotiation Guidance Associates and the extended family of Bert & Phyllis Lamb are pleased to announce that David Belcher, a junior in the Department of Political Science at UC-Davis, is the recipient of the 2015 Bert & Phyllis Lamb Prize in Political Science.

The 2015 Lamb Prize Selection Committee was favorably impressed by Mr. Belcher’s application, written proposal, and the experimental research he used to support his recommendation for moving toward Ranked Voting Systems (RVS) in America. His submission addressing an important issue, voter apathy and ignorance, was well-written and presented. The research empirically tested a creative solution to those issues. It also showed a command of prior research on the topic, identified competing arguments, and noted the limitations of his approach and recommendations. A précis of his proposal follows below. Given the high quality of his proposal, the Selection Committee sees a bright future in political science, if he chooses that path, and wishes him well in future endeavors.  Full Paper


The Bert & Phyllis Lamb Prize in Political Science is an annual award for excellence in writing and policy or program innovation that is open to undergraduates majoring in Political Science. The Prize is underwritten by the extended family of Bert & Phyllis Lamb through Negotiation Guidance Associates


An Efficient Electoral Method to Reduce Voter Ignorance 

David Belcher

University of California, Davis

The phenomenon of voter ignorance in the United States is extremely widespread and problematic. In order for citizens to meaningfully participate in the democratic process, and in order for the Government to take constituent desires into account when making policy decisions, people need to have a basic understanding of what they are voting for.

Previous research into the field of voter ignorance has examined the scope of the problem, but yielded no effective methods of reducing it. I examined whether the ballots used in the cutting-edge Ranked Choice Voting electoral system, which prompt feedback on multiple candidates, incentivize voters to learn more about candidates.

To answer this question, I performed an experiment in which examined two electoral institutions, First Past the Post (FPTP) and Ranked Choice Voting (RCV), and the effect that each system had on voter knowledge in a simulated election. I ran two simulated elections where the only difference between the two elections was the type of electoral system used. In both simulated elections, I provided participants with identical information about three real candidates who ran for California State Assembly in 2012. In one group, participants were told that they would vote for only one candidate (the FPTP group), while participants in the other group were asked to rank candidates in order of preference (the RCV group). I then quizzed all participants on their knowledge of the candidates’ biographies and policy positions, and then had them vote.

I found that participants in the RCV group scored a statistically significant amount higher on quizzes about the candidates’ biographies and policy positions than participants in the FPTP group. This result suggests that simply changing the method used to elect candidates can increase voter knowledge, and lead to a more smooth and efficient democratic system.

© David Belcher

Click Here to be directed to the published article.

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